Post 9/11 Intelligence Reform Impact and the Way Ahead

terminal Post 9/11 Intelligence refine Impact and the Way Ahead Daniel Ratner INTL 444 Professor Mead October 8, 2012 inlet After 9/11, an occurrence so shocking, and humiliating to both the Ameri crumb people, and the U. S. disposal, vast revitalizes were identify to undertake that an attack of this magnitude never happened again. From the ashes of this noisome act came cardinal study(ip) pieces of Intelligence reform. These documents were the 9/11 tutelage writing and The Intelligence Reform Act and Terrorist Prevent Act of 2004 (IRTPA).Both documents worked to reform the Intelligence Community (IC), and streamline current processes to improve the sharing of newsworthiness teaching, and products. With the sweeping changes mainly with the ITPRA the Intelligence Community is well on its way to being the major muscle group we take in it to be acting as a single unit as irrelevant to screen and individual muscles all trying to lift the same intemperate weight.With th e dislodgeings of the 9/11 management, the implementations of the IRTPA reserve taken long strides, still what can be d ace better? We will look at the two pieces of legislation, and therefore comp atomic number 18 and contrast the sweeping changes, and if the are loss in the correct direction. The 9/11 accusation Report In the set off of the 9/11 attacks, a group of politicians both Republican and Democrats came unneurotic to identify shortfalls and introduce a call for reform. According the tale, Our aim has non been to assign individual blame.Our aim has been to provide the fullest account of the events surrounding 9/11 and to identify lessons learned. When we as Americans go a major event in the fall in States, we always look for a scapegoat, the ideas behind the 9/11 commission was built as a bi-partisan group for sightly this reason. The cut across takes the events of 9/11 and attempts to rouge a picture of a major deprivation of understanding of the threat we face from radical Islam, as well as an otherwise(prenominal) disenchanted with is around the world.The 9/11 report goes deep into the history of the events surrounding 9/11, but very only spends about 25 pages of the 450 pages report identifying the shortcomings, and way in advance. Now date this is a macro view of the reforms fatalityed, it does leave much to the imagination. Post 9/11 Reform As we look at the reforms recommended we catch out that the commission broke the recommendations into major groups, they divided them into ways to give Overall Government Reform.This is subdivided into five dollar bill categories, a new agreement of Effort between extraneous and Domestic operations in an attempt to mandate primacy in contrasting types of operations to envision the proper agency is doing the correct job, A consonance of Effort for the Intelligence Community, Unity of Effort in Sharing Information, Unity of Effort of in the Congress, and finally how to better organiz ing Homeland defenses. While these are all important, the major issue was the neediness of ownership and sharing of lore between giving medicational agencies.As the 9/11 commission pushed for counterterrorism reform, it also pointed to a need for parole reform. the IC reform was aimed at the way we require process and disseminate parole. The 9/11 commission struck to identify, whether the government is organized adequately to direct resources and build the intelligence information capabilities it will need not just for countering terrorism, but for the broader range of subject area security challenges in the decades ahead. This viewpoint looks at the interior(a) Intelligence Agencies and strive to focus their forefinger to be both effective, and balanced. Coupled with these factors the 9/11 commission identified six major problems, the structural barriers to performing enounce intelligence work, lack of greenness standards and practices across the exotic-domestic divide. Divided management of national intelligence capabilities, debile capacity to set priorities and move resources, too many jobs, and too compound and secret. Structural Barriers To Performing voice Intelligence WorkAlong with the issues of trying to keep ahead of our enemies, we must also be adapted to share our information with other intelligence agencies, and our allies. As the 9/11 report utters National intelligence is still organized around the hoardion disciplines of the home agencies, not the correlative mission. The importance of integrated, all-source analysis cannot be overstated. Without it, it is not possible to connect the dots. No one component holds all the relevant information. While all agencies draw information, only done joint desegregation can we truly paint an accurate assessment of the facts.As a reference, the report cites the Goldwater Nichols legislation of 1986, in which operations as a whole were better envisioned though joint co-operative trai ning. It shows the strengths of these types of events and why we must incorporate more joint intelligence to be conquestful. Lack Of Common Standards and Practices Across the Foreign-Domestic Divide This portion of the report goes on to show the issues we father in the cases of both database management and dissemination of information. In cases of information gathered both home and abroad, there are issues with integration and synchronization of this workflow.Many have cited and shown how across the IC there are fivefold databases, of which there is no conduit to share information, multiple programs collecting the same data, but are not cross-matched, and in many cases redundant entries are make, and then not managed creating an abundance of information unable to be processed delinquent to a lack of manpower. Divided Management of National Intelligence Capabilities As the IC swelled in the post World War 2 and Cold War eras, we saw the abilities of many agencies in aggregation s dwindle and collapse.The report shoes the degradation of the CIAs efficiency to collect IMINT, and SIGINT. As the NSA, NRO NGIA, and other have been created, the HUMINT, OSINT and other intelligence collected by the CIA has had issues being authorize due to the in top decision maker to task other agencies assets. Some of these issues were solved through their acquisition of their own satellites and some reform, but again we see information that is collected by a sole agency, which is not easily overlap or validated by an outside source. Weak Capacity to gear up Priorities and Move ResourcesThe task organization of the IC and the way in which it is managed dangle on the music director of Central Intelligence, giving the CIA free reign in many cases, and also in many cases too much cogency to mismanage or squander resources. As they struggle to manage these resources, and fix all members of the IC are covered for what they need, there was little watchfulness in the aptit ude to prioritize collection efforts. Moreover, there was little though given to how to best manage , what they collect or the way they collect it. in any case Many Jobs As of the time of the 9/11 report the DCI had three jobs.Running of the CIA, manage the other members of the IC, and head analyst for the president of the United States. Any one of these businesss is a capstone to a successful rush in the days of 9/11 it fell on one person. As the report goes on to show, is the fact that, No recent DCI has been able to do all three effectively. Usually what loses out is management of the intelligence community This overtasking of an individual is not only reckless, but in many cases gave too much power to the CIA. The report finds that the DCI has three major shortcomings.They find that the DCI lacks the world power to control the funds allocated to the IC, the ability to remove or step in agency heads, and the ability to set the quality control and standardization of collec tion efforts. as well as Complex and Secret As if all the previous five findings were not enough, we also see the issue of a cumbersome and orphic group of organizations. At the time of the 9/11 report, the IC was comprised of 15 agencies, mainly managed by a single entity. This coupled with no slip away roadmap to how the groups interact, whom they report to, and how they fund operations.Intelligence Reform and terrorist act Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA) come out of the closet of the ashes of the events of 9/11 and the reforms brought forth by the 9/11 Commission report, came the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA). This legislation know as S. 2845was introduced by SenatorSusan CollinsofMaine. The bill was enacted after being gestural by the chairman on December 17, 2004. This legislation strove to take the 9/11 Commissions findings and implement them into law. As mentioned at the beginning of this paper, we mentioned six major problems the IC fa ced.Being that the IC was managed mainly based on the National pledge Act of 1947, the IRTPA brought changes to the IC by taking the bad and refining the peachy of each item. The major change seen in the IRTPA was the human beings of the Director of National Intelligence. As we had seen in the 9/11 report, the DCI was way too overtasked, and the need for an Intelligence Community to have a director. The Structural Barriers to Performing mutual Intelligence Work In the wake of 9/11 the Joint Intelligence Community Council.This council Chaired by the Director of National Intelligence, is comprised of all major Presidential advisors. It is chartered to assist the Director of National Intelligence in developing and implementing a joint, unified national intelligence effort to entertain national security This council also in the matter of advising the Legislative branch, whitethorn make recommendations to improve the IC. Lack of Common Standards and Practices Across the Foreign-Dome stic Divide With the creation of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) came the call for a performance of unwashed services. This charge stands to ensure that services previously not share, managed, or tacit are standardized. It also stands to provide a set of standards for the agencies to follow, and hence gravel regulated. Divided Management Of National Intelligence Capabilities Under the National warrantor Act of 1947, the DCI was the head of the IC, but under the IRTPA, a new position was enabled. The new position Director of National Intelligence, appointed by the President of the United States. This change gave the DCI more oversight of the CIA, and gave the President a capable matter expert, one who had a single focus job.This also gives the DNI the ability to manage the tasking of national collection assets, a job not rightfully performed before. Weak Capacity to Set Priorities and Move Resources In the case of the ability to set priorities, once again the charge goes to the DNI. He is charged to crap objectives, priorities, and guidance for the intelligence community to ensure timely and effective collection, processing, analysis, and dissemination This charge gives the DNI the ability manage resources, requirements, conflict resolution between agencies to entangle the use of assets, and collection platforms.The only person the DNI must concede to the President. Too Many Jobs While we had an issue of the DCI having too many jobs before, some force say that the DNO now has too many jobs. This is a misconception, since the DNI has no intelligence agency to manage, rather he has department heads to manage that job. He kinda focuses on the seamless and integrated manager of the whole gambit of intelligence. Too Complex and Secret The final goal of the IRTPA served to take the mystery and lack of oversight out of the IC. The establishment of an Inspector General to the DNI was enacted under the IRTPA.This office serves to manage ethical mat ters, settle complaints of favoritism, and ensure civil liberties are upheld through the actions of the IC and concurrence with National and International Laws. Other Changes Driven by the IRTPA The four findings recommended by the legislation are the following (1) Long-term success in the war on terrorism demands the use of all elements of national power, including diplomacy, military action, intelligence, covert action, law enforcement, economical policy, foreign aid, public diplomacy, and motherland defense. 2) To win the war on terrorism, the United States must assign to economic and diplomatic capabilities the same strategic priority that is assigned to military capabilities. (3) The legislative and executive branches of the Government of the United States must commit to robust, long-term investments in all of the tools necessary for the foreign policy of the United States to successfully fulfill the goals of the United States. (4) The investments referred to in paragraph (3) will require increased patronage to United States foreign affairs programs in general, and to priority areas as describe in this title in particular.By breaking these findings out, we can better see how the IC can transform and flex the major muscle it has the ability to do. While there were pages and pages of changes, and background these four findings standout as the major players in policy reforms. Long-term victor in the War on Terrorism To be successful in the war on terror, we must employ all possible assets and allies assets to our advantage. To do this we need to focus our efforts by sharing information, and ensuring that agencies are receiving timely and relevant updates to collected intelligence to ensure overall success.This sharing is critical to both foreign and domestic interests. agreement of Diplomatic, Economic and Military Influences The even balance of lethal, non-lethal and Humanitarian actions must be monitored and controlled. Too much use of any of these c an degrade the ability of the United States and its allys effects in foreign actions. It is also important to remember that even in an attempt to show ourselves as a hard target we must show mercy and understanding to those less fortunate than us.This is a necessity if only because we must show the rest of the world that we are not so devoid of emotion that we can relate with their plights and ways of life. Overall Governmental committal to Success The war of terror is a marathon not a race. Only though the applied funding, legislative drive to ensure resources, and the executive branch push to allow success of the IC can we conform to in the war on terror. We cannot allow political infighting, election cycles, suasion polls, or other media-like reports to stop our drive for the end-state.While not always pretty, cost-effective, and popular, the involve of the IC to gather raw data must be protected. Added distractors such(prenominal) as political infighting in cases such as t he passing, or re-authorization of the nationalist Act are great examples of the dangers the IC faces in achieving its goals. Commitment to Success and its Costs As stated above, this marathon is not always going to be cost-effective. Emerging technologies, payouts to sources, replacing of equipment, and other costs, not always made privy to the general public must be supported.Failure to the fund the IC can be detrimental to their success. While oversight is needed to ensure embezzlement is not a factor, the budget increases the IC requests should not be delayed or jeopardized by political adversaries, nor used as a talking point. This is currently seen in the $500 Billion defense cuts enacted by supercommittee legislations as face now. Conclusion As we see the changes made in the past 8 years since its inception, the IRTPA has helped the IC, but has not frigid it yet.While the DNI creation was a good thing, we do still see cases of the DNI have too much responsibility, and too mu ch work. In some cases the added changes have brought more costs in bureaucratic startup, oversight, and staffing. While the need to separate the DCI from the rest of the agencies was important, the IRTPA has limited the CIAs abilities an a variety of ways. Other advantages have been the information sharing of intelligence. The sharing has instituted policies and procedures as well as shared technology serves to better share information in a common platform.All things being combined, the IRTPA has been a game changer for the IC, only through reform, and through lessons learned will we strengthen and improve our practices, keeping our country safer. Bibliography 9/11 Commission. The 9/11 Commission Report Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. Report, Washington, D. C. U. S. Government opinion Office, 2004. Andrew, Christopher. For Presidents Eyes Only Secret Intelligence and the American presidency from Washington to Bush. New York Ha rper Press. Beckner, Christian.Implementing the 9/11 Commission Recommendations An Analysis. http//www. hlswatch. com/sitedocs/Implementing%20the%20911%20Commission%20Recs. pdf (accessed October 03, 2012). Congress, 108th. parole REFORM AND TERRORISM PREVENTION ACT OF 2004. 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